After the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, tension arose in two countries relations and then the political relations were broken off. The US was seeking to release the hostages. The responsibility of resolving this problem was entrusted by the leader of the Iranian revolution to the parliament which in turn passed a resolution creating four conditions for resolving the hostages' problem. Algeria was accepted by both parties as a mediator and two declarations and one document of obligations entitled as Algeria Accords were signed. The hostages were set free and the US accepted not to intervene in the Iranian internal affairs, to end litigation against Iran and to freeze the Shah's assets. Iran - United States Claims Arbitral Tribunal is a product of Algeria Accords' agreements which was created to deal with the conflicts and claims of the two countries.There are three criteria to distinguish the international nature of a tribunal:1) The founding document of the tribunal shall be an international one.2) The law governing it shall be international law. 3) The authorities controlling the tribunal shall follow international law.Without doubt, having the three criteria, the nature of above mentioned tribunal is an international one which using the rules and regulations of international law has founded a useful procedure within international law.

Field and Aims: Corrupt on foreign investment and its results in the ICSID procedure is one of the new topics in international investment law. Investigating the different dimensions and the impact of the ICSID procedure on investor’, s rights and the responsibility of the host state in relation to foreign investment is of importance, objectives and subject matter of this article. Method: The research method is descriptive-analytical and critical to answer a question, what is the impact of corrupted foreign investment on investor rights and the responsibility of the host state in the ICSID procedure? Finding and Conclusion: The findings show that arbitration based on the investment treaty combined with corruption is rejected at the request of the foreign investor in the ICSID. This procedure has two achievements, two on the same coin. First, the investor is deprived of legal protections and arbitration. Ignoring investor rights resulting from playing its role as the first party to corruption is self-imposed and inevitable. Second, the host state is clear of responsibility for the foreign investor by corruption defense and proving it. The situation suggests a benefit of corruption for the host state, while host state agents are also the second party to corruption.

According to a legal rule, the burden of proof is on the claimant who presents a claim to prove the facts and difficulty in proving the claim never frees the claimant from the obligation to prove. If the claimant does not provide sufficient evidence to prove its claim he has acted at its own disadvantage. On the other hand, in the arbitration agreement, the principle of party autonomy is an accepted principle and according to it, the parties are free to choose the procedural and substantive provisions governing the agreement. This article tries to determine whether the authority of the parties in determining the governing law includes the authority to adjust and change the burden of proof with the descriptiveـanalytical method. It is obvious that this authority, as well as the authority of the arbitral tribunal about adjustment of the burden of proof, should not lead to a change that would conflict with public policy, mandatory rule, and rules related to the principle of equal and fair treatment of the parties. There are different opinions about whether the burden of proof has a procedural or substantive nature but our review in this article shows that the dominant tendency in the international commercial arbitration procedure is that the rule of burden of proof has a substantive nature. 

To date there has been little disagreement on the fact that arbitrators are obligated to be impartial and independent; the rules and provisions of all the major international and domestic arbitral regimes are in accord that arbitrators have to be impartial and independent, so these obligations have turned into an international custom. Failure to this commitment can be a basis for challenging and disqualifiying an arbitrator in international and domestic arbitrations. The non-neutral arbitrator in United States’ arbitration system is a legal structure which is in opposite to the international practice, and presumes that the party-appointed arbitrators in a tripartite arbitration would not be neutral. This means that, in practice, they are not only free to act as advocates for the positions of the party that appointed them, they are expected to act in such a way to dictate the outcome of the proceedings for the benefit of appointing party. The purpose of this article is to determine the concept, grounds and basis of non-neutral arbitration and its significant opposition to the fundamental principles of arbitration. In the fourth section, the authors discuss the impartiality of arbitrators in Iran-United States of America arbitral tribunal.

Notwithstanding the explicit provision for interpretive awards under Article 32 of Iran’s Law on International Commercial Arbitration, their application in domestic arbitration remains contentious. However, their existence may be inferred from instruments such as Article 9 of the 2022 Arbitration Fee Regulations. The absence of a comprehensive definition for interpretive awards has perpetuated conceptual confusion and facilitated their misuse as substitutes for revision procedures—a problematic tendency that, when considered alongside the significant benefits of properly utilized interpretive awards, underscores the critical importance of precisely understanding this legal mechanism. Interpretive awards must be conceptualized within established legal frameworks including res judicata and functus officio. Crucially, such awards address only those ambiguities arising from either drafting deficiencies or divergent party interpretations, rendering them fundamentally distinct from supplementary or corrective awards. In international law, interpretive awards appear in various instruments including the 1976 UNCITRAL Rules (which govern the Iran-U.S. arbitration agreement). International practice demonstrates that valid interpretation requests must satisfy specific criteria: (1) demonstration of genuine ambiguity; (2) pursuit of clarification rather than substantive modification; (3) direct relevance to the award’s scope; and (4) grounding in established factual circumstances. Proper requests should additionally include: (a) the ambiguous text; (b) explanation of the ambiguity; and (c) the parties’ conflicting interpretations. The jurisprudence of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal confirms that failure to meet these requirements has resulted in uniform rejection of interpretation requests.

One of the most important issues which has long been considered as a shortfall in the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) is the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to issue interim orders. Currently, neither the court nor the arbitral tribunal can freely grant the interim measure so that the tribunals and the court hardly accept the plea for granting the interim measure. The reason lies in the shortfalls of the law as the courts’ interpretation of Article 311 of CPC is that only the court receiving the case at the first place can grant such interim order as the issuance of interim orders requires specific authorization by the law. Such opinion is more emphasized when the parties to the dispute fail to clearly grant such authorization to the arbitrators. However, granting the right to arbitrators to issue interim orders is needed in for a sound arbitral proceedings. The present paper tries to clarify which authority has the jurisdiction to deal with urgent cases and issue interim orders in arbitral proceedings: the arbitral tribunal or the court or both? This paper also examines how it would be possible for arbitral tribunal to enforce an interim order. Finally, the consequences of the gap in the CPC on the issue of issuing interim orders by arbitral tribunal will be discussed.

There seem to be conflict of interests between protecting environment and supporting foreign investment. On one hand, expropriation is mentioned in investment agreements and arbitration practice. On the other hand, host states emphasize on states sovereignty and expropriate foreign investor by claiming environmental and natural resources protection. To solve the conflicts between foreign investment law and international environmental law, some international agreements, instruments and awards mentioned the priority of environmental protection. Foreign investment arbitration practice has a considerable approach in this regard. Arbitral tribunals assessed the claim of environmental risk as a cause of legitimate expropriation. Since compensation is a result of legitimate expropriation, arbitral tribunals mentioned it in their awards. In some cases, according to international practice or findings of the tribunal, as occurrence of environmental risks seems to be serious, the tribunal assessed the host state approach as a legal act and the compensation is excluded.

One of the most controversial issues in international commercial arbitrations in the last two decades is enforcement of arbitral awards which have been annulled in their country/ies of issuance or in broader word in their country/ies of origin. Two contradictory opinions on the matter are based on two different approaches on territorial or extraterritorial effect of nullification of arbitral award by competent court. Considering the French court’s recent judgment on enforcement of arbitral award rendered in PT Putrabali Adyamulia v. Dena Holding case, despite its annulment in the country where it was made i.e. United Kingdom, author is interested in studying the theoretical and practical aspects of enforcement of nullified arbitral award in this article.

“Terms of Reference” is one of the important documents that should be produced in some international arbitration. There are various views regarding the question of whether the terms of reference is a new arbitration agreement or is just a procedural requirement in the process of arbitration. However, it is a separate document which differs from the arbitration agreement. Terms of references is commonly known as a feature of arbitration Under International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration and could also be seen in some other arbitration rules. According to ICC Arbitration Rules, it is compulsory for the parties and the arbitral tribunal to set the Terms of Reference, but under some other arbitration rules, such as Japan Arbitration Association, it is optional. Terms of references should be prepared and signed by the parties and arbitrators as soon as the file is handed over to the arbitral tribunal. The main function of this document is to determine the issues on which the arbitral tribunal should concentrate during the arbitral proceeding. This paper examines content and legal status of Terms of reference in commercial arbitration and concludes that the Terms of References could, to a great extent, facilitate and increase efficiency and accuracy in both institutional and ad hoc arbitration.

The taking of evidence is one of the central issues in every international arbitration procedure which includes producing documents, hearing parties and also doing inspections. It is important for the parties and arbitral tribunal to be aware of the rules that govern the taking of evidence, because issuing any award by the arbitration tribunal requires the involvement with the taking of evidence process. By studying international instruments, national laws on arbitration, the procedures of international arbitration institutions and also the awards of arbitral tribunals, it becomes clear that because of the consensual nature of arbitration, the rules on the taking of evidence have been based on the principle of party autonomy. The will of the parties in this regard may be explicit or implicit or even may be in the form of the delegation of the authority to the arbitrator to determine the rules. However, the arbitral tribunal and the parties should comply with the due process requirements, the efficient proceedings principle, the duty of good faith and the principle of confidentiality.